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DOES INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NEED  
A MANDATORY RULES METHOD? 
 
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt* 
 
If the articles in this volume are any guide, the role of mandatory rules in 
international arbitration remains a persistent source of debate.  The basic problem 
is a straightforward one:  contractual arbitration arises as a matter of the parties’ 
consent, but the resolution of contractual disputes can implicate mandatory rules 
of law that are not waivable and are typically designed to protect broader public 
rights.  Since national legal systems began ceding the application of mandatory 
rules to party-appointed arbitrators, scholars of international arbitration have 
struggled to come to grips with the implications of this reality for the resolution of 
cross-border disputes in which the public policy of several states is at stake. 
The literature on mandatory rules has often presented the issue in stark terms, 
as posing a fundamental “conflict between the will of the State having 
promulgated the mandatory rules of law, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the will of the parties—from which [the arbitrator’s] own authority is derived.”1  
Asserting an independent public duty to protect national mandatory laws as well 
as the enforceability of arbitral awards, a number of writers have further urged 
arbitrators to apply a so-called “mandatory rules method” to determine, regardless 
of what the parties have agreed, which particular mandatory rules to apply in a 
particular dispute.  Although the details of the method differ from author to 
author, the basic proposition is that arbitrators should apply a stand-alone 
balancing test that considers, based on the nature of the rule and the connection to 
the parties’ transaction, the strength of a particular state’s interest in having its 
mandatory rules enforced.2 
In these remarks, I take a skeptical view of the mandatory rules literature and 
argue that arbitration of mandatory rules is readily handled within the standard, 
contractual view of arbitration.  In particular, I argue that the alleged conflict 
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author had the 
privilege of presenting an earlier draft of this article at the Colloquium on Mandatory 
Rules of Law in International Arbitration, held at Columbia Law School on June 8, 2007.  
He extends his gratitude to organizers George A. Bermann and Loukas Mistelis and to the 
other participants in the colloquium for their helpful comments. 
1 Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L  
274 (1986).  
2 See generally Mayer, supra note 1; See also Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of 
Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 14(4) J. INT’L ARB. 23 (1997); 
Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in 
International Commercial Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 Am. 
Rev. Int’l. Arb. 319 (1996); Serge Lazareff, Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of 
National Law, 11(2) ARB. INT’L 137, 142 (1995); Daniel Hochstrasser, Choice of Law and 
‘Foreign’ Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration, 11(1) J. INT’L ARB. 57, 85-86 
(1994). 
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between mandatory rules and party autonomy reflects a mistaken view of national 
arbitrability doctrines that, once corrected, deprives the case for a special 
mandatory rules method of much of its force.  At the same time, however, the 
consequences of this insight are more limited than might be supposed because 
modern arbitration agreements generally give arbitrators far more authority to 
consider and apply mandatory rules than advocates of the mandatory rules method 
have assumed.  Indeed, because arbitrators can typically claim contractual 
authority to apply all applicable mandatory rules, the actual effect of relying on a 
separate mandatory rules method will be to narrow rather than to expand the 
number of mandatory rues within the arbitrator’s cognizance.  There may be 
reasons why this narrowing is prudent, but that is not a question to which the 
existing literature has thus far paid much attention.  Future discussion of 
mandatory rules arbitration should therefore take better account both of national 
arbitrability laws and the full range of options typically facing the international 
arbitrator. 
My discussion proceeds in two parts.  I begin with a review of the national 
perspective.  Drawing from the United States’ experience, I consider the choices 
that local courts and legislatures have in deciding whether, and to what extent, to 
recognize arbitration of mandatory rules.  Although the questions here are distinct 
from those facing arbitrators themselves, the transnational system by which 
arbitration agreements are recognized and enforced necessarily plays a critical role 
in framing arbitrators’ choices.  In this respect, the U.S. model provides both a 
representative example of a national arbitration law and an especially important 
historical force that, largely on account of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,3 provoked the original 
debate over the mandatory rules method.   The second part of the article turns to 
the perspective of the arbitrator.  Here, I critique the position that arbitrators 
should apply mandatory rules not authorized by the parties’ agreement, I consider 
the extent to which modern arbitration agreements nevertheless do authorize 
arbitrators to apply a wide range of mandatory rules arising under different legal 
systems, and I ask whether a mandatory rules method might nevertheless have a 
role to play once the questions have been properly framed.4   
 
                                                                                                                      
3  473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). 
4 In part, this article condenses ideas that Donald Francis Donovan and I have 
previously published as a book chapter.  See Donald Francis Donovan and Alexander K.A. 
Greenawalt, Mitsubishi After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules Before Courts and 
International Arbitrators, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
(Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006).  The article goes beyond that effort, however, 
in giving more sustained attention to the possible theoretical foundations that might justify 
some version of the mandatory rules method.  As part of this analysis, it considers the 
ways which United States case law post-Mitsubishi may have weakened the non-
waivability of mandatory rules, thus establishing a national arbitration law framework that 
is somewhat more conducive to the mandatory rules method than would be suggested by 
Mitsubishi itself. 
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I.  MANDATORY RULES AND DOMESTIC LEGAL POLICY 
 
Debate over domestic responses to mandatory rules arbitration reduces to one 
fundamental question:  Can arbitrators be entrusted with the adjudication of 
domestic public policies?  Although primarily a question to be answered by 
individual legal systems, is also has obvious relevance to the work of international 
arbitrators, both because it impacts the scope of questions submitted to arbitration 
and because arbitration always takes place in the shadow of the judicial review 
that a party may seek in a national court. 
States wary about the possible erosion of their public policies will be tempted 
to require greater oversight of mandatory rules than that afforded to contractual 
claims.  Domestic legal systems might prohibit arbitration of mandatory rules 
entirely, or they might require courts to exercise heightened scrutiny review, for 
example by reviewing de novo the merits of mandatory rule determinations at the 
enforcement stage.  The attraction of this approach is obvious:  the domestic 
state’s courts retain the ability to police the application of their own mandatory 
rules, ensuring perhaps that an arbitral tribunal will not produce an enforceable 
award that violates the state’s public policy.5   
The fact that many states do not follow this approach, however, reflects the 
potential impact upon another public policy:  that favoring arbitration as a neutral 
and relatively efficient means of resolving cross-border disputes between parties 
who may be justifiably wary of being dragged into each others’ respective court 
systems.6  The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, has long interpreted its national 
arbitration laws to impose an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute 
resolution” which has “special force”7 in the international context, and we have 
seen the rise of an international treaty system highly favorable to arbitration as a 
means of resolving both private party and investor-state disputes.8  Judicial 
determination or review of mandatory rules otherwise submitted to arbitration 
raises multiple concerns:  national courts may exploit their review to undo arbitral 
awards for improper reasons; the efficiencies of arbitration may be lost on account 
of duplicative litigation, especially where contractual and mandatory claims share 
a common factual basis; and parties, cognizant of this last point, may invoke 
frivolous mandatory rules claims as a deliberate means of frustrating the 
arbitration agreement.  
A more relaxed approach allows parties to submit mandatory rules to 
conclusive arbitration without substantive judicial review.  That is the course that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed, most famously in its Mitsubishi decision, 
which focused on the arbitrability of U.S. competition law under the Sherman Act.  
                                                                                                                      
5 See generally Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization of International 
Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647, 647-49 (1999). 
6 Id.   
7 See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631. 
8 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-
208) [hereinafter N.Y. Convention]. 
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After finding that Respondent Soler’s Sherman Act claims were within the scope 
of the parties’ arbitration clause, the Court determined the claims to be arbitrable 
and dismissed Soler’s action to bring those claims in U.S. court.  In famous dicta, 
the Court further emphasized that arbitration was not tantamount to waiver, and 
that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in 
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies, we 
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public 
policy.”9  Accordingly, the Court also emphasized the availability of judicial 
review at the award enforcement stage—Mitsubishi’s so-called “second look,”—
but cautioned that such review would be limited to “ascertain[ing] that the tribunal 
took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.”10  Mitsubishi, 
in sum, stands for the proposition that mandatory rules, or at least some of them, 
may be conclusively left to arbitral determination, but they cannot be waived. 
As should be apparent, the success of Mitsubishi’s two pillars—arbitrability 
and non-waivability—depends greatly on the reliability of private arbitration as a 
means of vindicating national public policies.  The advisability of this approach 
depends greatly in turn on how one responds to the following three questions, 
which I consider in turn: 
 
A.  Is Mitsubishi Worth the Risk of Under-Enforcement of Mandatory Rules in 
Individual Cases? 
 
As the premise of this question reflects, Mitsubishi’s highly deferential review 
of arbitrated mandatory rule disputes will necessarily lead to some under-
enforcement of mandatory law.  Arbitrators applying mandatory rules will of 
course reach the wrong decision in some cases.  Because Mitsubishi deprives 
courts of substantive judicial review over arbitrable mandatory rules claims that 
the arbitrators have “taken cognizance of” and “actually decided,” bad decisions 
will remain uncorrected in cases in which more substantive review would have 
caught and corrected the adjudicator’s error.  Those for whom this consideration 
alone is a deal breaker will reject the Mitsubishi approach.   
The reason that arbitration of mandatory rules has nonetheless received 
judicial tolerance reflects at least two inter-related considerations beyond the 
general public policy favoring arbitration.  First, because arbitration itself is 
voluntary, there is no guarantee that mandatory rules violations will receive 
judicial enforcement in the first place:  the parties are free to settle their claims 
and may even fail to pursue them.  From this perspective, a party who receives a 
bad arbitration award may seem little different from a party who has entered into a 
disadvantageous settlement award that fails to capture the full value of her claim.    
Second, and more fundamentally, the possibility of individual bad outcomes is 
far more palatable if there is no reason to expect ex ante that arbitration will 
provide a less secure means of vindicating mandatory rules than litigation.   As 
                                                                                                                      
9  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. 
10 Id. at 638. 
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long as parties have no particular expectation that they can escape mandatory rules 
by entering into arbitration agreements, those rules will vindicate public policy by 
exerting a deterrent effect, and parties weighing whether to bring or settle claims 
will do so in the shadow of mandatory law.  Arbitrators may, of course, end up 
under-enforcing mandatory rules in the individual case, but this prospect may not 
affect the parties’ behavior as long as the arbitrators are just as likely to err in the 
other direction by over-enforcing mandatory law.11 
Even so, one might seek to distinguish between mandatory rules, perhaps 
ceding arbitrators greater deference in the economic sphere of competition and 
securities laws while perhaps exercising greater scrutiny in areas like 
discrimination law that speak to deeper, dignitary values that might seem the more 
appropriate province of the judiciary.  The U.S. courts, for their part, have by and 
large rejected such distinctions and have instead applied the Mitsubishi framework 
broadly in cases where a statute establishing privately enforceable mandatory 
rules is silent on the question of arbitrability.12  
 
B.  Is Private Arbitration Biased Against the Enforcement of Mandatory Rules? 
 
In light of the above, the most sustained academic criticism of Mitsubishi 
approach has focused not on the prospect that individual arbitrations might under-
enforce mandatory rules, but on the fear that the arbitral system may be 
systematically predisposed toward that result.  Concern here has focused on the 
fact that arbitrators are paid by the parties and selected according to a mechanism 
of the parties’ choice.   As Eric Posner has argued, “arbitrators would want to 
ignore mandatory rules because they know that merchants, ex ante, prefer that 
their contracts be enforced as written and would prefer to pay for the services of 
arbitrators who enforce the contract rather than the mandatory rules that the 
contract may violate.”13  Following Andrew Guzman’s more careful elaboration of 
this insight, the proposition must be that arbitral appointing institutions—also paid 
by the parties—reflect this bias, because typically it is the appointing institution, 
and not the individual arbitrator, whom the contract selects ex ante before a 
dispute has arisen.14   Thus, the theory is that appointing institutions, when acting 
                                                                                                                      
11 Notably, the Mitsubishi court expressly “decline[d] to indulge the presumption that 
the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain 
competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.”  Id. at 634. 
12 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & 
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 
Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 151 (1st Cir. 1998) (Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990). 
13  Posner, supra note 5, at 650. 
14 Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory 
Rules, 49 DUKE L. J. 1279, 1302-07 (2000). Procedures for appointing arbitrators are 
generally provided in a set of procedural rules that the parties designate in their contract. 
Often those rules are promulgated by an arbitral institution such as the International 
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to select sole or tie-breaking arbitrators, will choose arbitrators biased against 
mandatory rules.  By contrast, party-selected arbitrators should not be expected on 
balance to reflect this bias, because each party will have the opportunity to select 
an arbitrator after the dispute has arisen, at which point the parties will make their 
selections in full knowledge of whether they wish to urge or oppose application of 
a mandatory rule, and can take this circumstance into consideration. 
To the extent one may draw conclusions based on the discussion at the 
symposium giving rise to this volume, this account of arbitrator bias does not find 
much sympathy among the elite group of scholars and practitioners who actually 
serve as arbitrators in the kinds of disputes supervised by the major international 
appointing institutions.  Of course, bias need not be conscious:  one can imagine a 
world in which all arbitrators conscientiously seek to apply applicable law and 
achieve the “right” result but are nevertheless drawn from a slanted pool that, 
statistically speaking, is less likely to enforce mandatory rules than the average 
court in the jurisdiction that promulgated the rule.   But such conjecture rests on 
too many untested assumptions that caution against reaching firm conclusions—
not to speak of policy prescriptions—based on the simple fact that arbitrators are 
paid by the parties.   One would need to know something about the actual demand 
for mandatory rule evasion among parties who sign on to arbitration clauses, and 
in particular whether such demand is significant enough to affect the economics of 
appointing institutions.  One would also need to take account of other arbitrator 
incentives pointing in the other direction, incentives such as the general desire to 
provide the neutral and competent decision-making that so many parties seek from 
international arbitration (and fear that they cannot receive from the national courts 
of the other party), and the reputational interests of arbitrators both inside and 
outside the arbitral community. 
The complexity of the issue suggests, at minimum, that the specter of arbitral 
bias must be assessed as an empirical question, not simply a theoretical one.  And 
here, the existing evidence is at best inconclusive.  Studies have failed thus far to 
establish bias in arbitration generally, including, for example, in the context of 
domestic U.S. employment disputes where the prevalence of repeat player 
defendants would seem to create a clear incentive for bias against plaintiffs.15  
Focusing on the specific issue of mandatory rules, some commentators, Donald 
Francis Donovan and myself included, have noted the general dearth of U.S. case 
law challenging post-Mitsubishi mandatory rule determinations by international 
arbitrators, suggesting perhaps that under-enforcement of mandatory rules is not 
as common a feature of the system as some have feared.16 
                                                                                                                      
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA), in which 
case the promulgating institution will generally be designated as the appointing authority. 
The commonly used UNCITRAL Rules provide for ad hoc arbitration with the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague, The Netherlands serving as the appointing authority. 
15 For a summary of the literature with citations, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From 
Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool:  Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration, __ Mich. J. L. Ref. __ (forthcoming, 2008) 
16 See Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 38; Posner, supra note 5, at 667-68. 
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C.   Is Mitsubishi Justified Even It Results in the Under-Enforcement of 
Mandatory Rules? 
 
Even if arbitration of mandatory rules does result in some under-enforcement 
of national public policies, might the Mitsubishi approach be justified 
nonetheless?17  The issue might be viewed as one of balancing competing public 
policies:  the public policy in favor of arbitration versus the public policies 
reflected by mandatory rules.  William Park has noted, for example, that a “special 
rule of arbitrability for the international realm would be justified under a hierarchy 
of societal policies that take into account the peculiar need for neutrality in 
resolution of international contracts disputes.”18 
Although Mitsubishi’s anti-waiver principle would seem opposed to such 
balancing, lower federal courts have used the precedent to do precisely that.  In a 
series of cases arising out of the Lloyd’s of London bankruptcy, and exemplified 
by Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s,19 the federal courts of appeals have enforced 
arbitration and judicial forum selection agreements even on the assumption that 
English courts and arbitrators would not enforce applicable U.S. securities and 
racketeering laws invoked by the plaintiffs.  Emphasizing considerations of 
comity, the Roby Court reached this somewhat surprising outcome by effectively 
redefining the non-waivable “right” protected by Mitsubishi to be one that allows 
some dilution of mandatory law.20  The fundamental question, in the Court’s view, 
was not whether the specific content of U.S. mandatory law would apply, but 
instead whether the available remedies were sufficient to vindicate the statutory 
policies underlying that mandatory law.  Although English law allowed neither the 
“controlling person” liability of U.S. securities law nor the treble damages offered 
by the RICO statute, the Court reasoned that English law was nevertheless 
sufficient “to deter British issuers from exploiting American investors through 
fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure.”21  In other words, while 
mandatory rules must be protected, that protection may take a diluted form.   
                                                                                                                      
17 An added complexity which deserves mention is that not all cases of reduced 
enforcement properly count as under-enforcement.  One obvious example is the fear that 
national courts are biased against foreign parties.  If that fear is justified, then arbitration 
may well avoid the illegitimate and discriminatory application of mandatory rules by 
national courts in cases involving foreign parties.  Similar, although more complex, is the 
situation in which a nation’s courts are more aggressive about the application of 
mandatory rules than the legislature intended or than might otherwise be desirable 
according to some other benchmark.  The latter problem raises the difficult question of 
how exactly one measures the “correct” amount of mandatory rule enforcement. 
18 See William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding 
Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 629, 667 (1986). 
19 996 F.2d 1353, 1361-66 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 
F.3d 956, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928-30 (4th 
Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1993). 
20 Roby, 996 F.2d at 1364-65. 
21 Id. at 1365.  
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II.  THE MANDATORY RULES METHOD 
 
I turn now to the perspective of the arbitrator deciding whether or not to apply 
a particular mandatory rule in a particular dispute.  Although distinct from the 
question of arbitrability, the debate over what arbitrators should do with 
mandatory law has focused heavily on the implications—both real and 
perceived—of national arbitration law.  Beginning with Pierre Mayer’s seminal 
article published shortly after the Mitsubishi decision, the debate has largely been 
defined by the writings of those who, like Mayer, have urged the adoption of a 
special “mandatory rules method” to govern arbitration of mandatory rules.  The 
argument proceeds roughly as follows:  By ceding arbitrators the authority to 
apply mandatory national law, decisions like Mitsubishi have exploded the 
traditional contractual basis of arbitration.22  Because mandatory rules are not 
subject to party consent, the parties’ own choice of law cannot bind the 
arbitrator’s determination of which, if any, mandatory law to apply.  The arbitrator 
must therefore move beyond the contract and make an independent 
determination—typically via a balancing test based on the totality of the 
circumstances—of which states’ mandatory rules deserve application in a 
particular dispute.23  The precise criteria vary from author to author, but generally 
draw inspiration from conflict of laws doctrines applied in domestic courts, in 
particular Article 7 of the European Union’s Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which provides that states parties may give 
effect to “to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the 
situation has a close connection.”24 
As I outline below, arbitrability of mandatory rules does not in fact involve a 
departure from the contractual basis of arbitration.  That fact alone, however, does 
not doom the mandatory rules method, because in most cases the contract itself 
will afford arbitrators great discretion to determine whether and which mandatory 
rules should apply.  Seen in its proper context, however, the mandatory rules 
method is the progeny not of Mitsubishi, but of the Roby line of cases.  In other 
                                                                                                                      
22 Blessing, supra note 2, at 38 (“under the US perspectives set on the basis of 
Mitsubishi v. Soler and the threat of the ‘second-look doctrine’, it is quite clear that an 
arbitral tribunal has a perceived duty, and not only a right, to examine the compatibility 
with US antitrust laws ex officio, wherever a matter could have anti-competitive effects 
within the United States.”); Mayer, supra note 1, at 297-80 (The [Mitsubishi] decision is 
nonetheless of fundamental importance in that it demonstrates the connection between the 
issue of the right to apply mandatory rules and the obligation to do so.  In holding that 
arbitrators have a right to apply such rules, the Supreme Court appears to presume that 
they are in some manner obliged to do so, which in turn makes it possible to trust them in 
this matter.”). 
23 See generally Mayer, supra note 1; Blessing, supra note, 2; Voser, supra note 2; 
Lazareff, supra note 2. 
24  Rome Convention, Art. 7, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1.  The Convention will be replaced 
by Regulation No. 593/2008 of June 17, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L. 177) 6, when the Regulation 
enters into force in 2009. 
2007] DOES INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NEED A MANDATORY RULES METHOD? 111 
  
words, it is a method which operates to limit rather than expand the mandatory 
law potentially applicable in arbitration.  Whether such limitation is in fact 
desirable remains a question that has received insufficient consideration. 
  
A.  Mandatory Rules Beyond the Arbitration Clause 
 
Consider the following hypothetical scenario.  During the course of their 
contractual negotiations, Soler discovers that Mitsubishi has a reputation for anti-
competitive practices.  Desiring the protections of the Sherman Act, and fearing 
that a panel of Japanese arbitrators will be reluctant to vindicate U.S. competition 
laws, Soler succeeds in narrowing its contractual arbitration clause via express 
language stating that the arbitration agreement shall not extend to claims or 
defenses arising out of the Sherman Act.  By doing so, Soler does not seek to 
waive mandatory law, but instead merely wishes to preserve a judicial forum for 
any such claims or defenses.  Surely, an arbitrator faced with this language would 
not be justified in bypassing the contract and applying the Sherman Act 
nonetheless on account of a mandatory rules method.  Indeed, an arbitrator who 
did so would jeopardize the award under Article V(1)(c) of the New York 
Convention which permits courts to refused enforcement where “[t]he award deals 
with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration.”25 
As this hypothetical suggests, the mandatory nature of competition law must 
not be confused with the discretionary nature of arbitration itself.  Just as no one is 
forced to sign contractual arbitration clauses in the first place, no one should be 
forced to arbitrate disputes arising under mandatory rules.  The point of 
Mitsubishi’s anti-waiver principle is that some forum must remain available for 
the vindication of mandatory rules, but that forum need not be an arbitral forum.   
This basic logic provides a contractual rationale for mandatory rules 
arbitration that stands up remarkably well to the arguments put forward by those 
who urge arbitrators to look beyond the contract.  It is true, for example, that 
arbitral refusal to take cognizance of a mandatory rule may result in that rule 
being bypassed because the victorious party seeks enforcement in a jurisdiction 
that does not recognize the rule.26  Assuming Soler had assets in Japan, one can 
imagine Mitsubishi enforcing an eventual arbitral award there, thus avoiding the 
U.S. court system and, to the extent the Japanese courts refused to apply it, the 
Sherman Act as well.  But that would also be the result in the event that the parties 
had never entered into an arbitration agreement in the first instance and Mitsubishi 
had pursued its case in Japanese court from the very beginning.  And in both cases 
                                                                                                                      
25  N.Y. Convention, supra note 8. 
26  This particular concern prompted debate among the participants at the June 8, 2007 
Colloquium on Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration at Columbia Law 
School, where I presented an earlier draft of this paper.  The broader concern that 
arbitration might provide a means of evading applicable mandatory rules has been a 
constant theme of the mandatory rules literature since Mayer wrote on the topic in 1986.  
See Mayer, supra note 1. 
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Soler remains free to pursue its Sherman Act claim in U.S. court.  That route may 
or not provide an effective remedy:  much depends on the strength of the claim, 
whether the U.S. courts will entertain it, where enforcement will be sought, and 
what effect, if necessary, foreign courts will give to the outcome of the U.S. 
proceeding.  But these potential roadblocks exists regardless of the existence of an 
arbitration agreement. 
A second argument observes that the arbitrator’s refusal to apply a mandatory 
rule may lead to the annulment or non-enforcement of the resulting award, thus 
violating the arbitrator’s putative duty to produce an enforceable award.27  But 
what exactly is the nature of this duty, such as it may exist?  It is, of course, 
reasonable to assume that when parties elect to submit their disputes to arbitration, 
they do so with the expectation that this method will prove effective and efficient.  
Indeed, parties will often adopt procedural rules that explicitly instruct the 
arbitrators to safeguard award enforceability.28  But this is merely to say that a 
general duty to protect enforceability can be implied from the parties’ agreement.  
It is a very different proposition to argue that arbitrators should invoke this duty as 
means of exceeding or violating the parties’ agreement, particularly where 
application of a mandatory rule excluded by the parties will operate to change the 
result of the dispute.  This approach is especially problematic in cases where the 
arbitrator does not know where enforcement will be pursued, or where a 
victorious claimant has the ability to enforce the award in multiple jurisdictions.  
For example, an arbitrator invoking a public policy against punitive damages 
drawn from the anticipated jurisdiction of enforcement might end up denying 
significant relief to a deserving claimant who actually intends to enforce in a 
different jurisdiction that has no such rule. 
A third argument focuses on scenarios in which the parties’ motive for 
excluding arbitration of mandatory rules might be less pure than in the 
hypothetical I posed above.  It might be the case, for example, that the parties 
have entered into an illegal venture involving money laundering, bribery, child 
trafficking or some other corrupt activity.  Wishing to resolve a particular dispute 
without calling attention to the illicit nature of their transaction, the parties 
commit to arbitration but preclude the tribunal from applying the mandatory rules 
that render the entire contract unenforceable.  Although the arbitrator could simply 
resolve the contractual dispute while leaving mandatory law for the enforcing 
court to apply, the arbitrator may well be in a better position to detect the 
illegality, given the richer factual record before her, and the disincentive the 
parties may have to raise the issue before an enforcing court.  The arbitrator 
                                                                                                                      
27 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 1. (“[The arbitrator] should seek to respect the contract 
and the intent of the parties, but at the same time be concerned with the efficacy of his 
award and the avoidance of annulment.”) 
28 For example, Article 35 of the ICC Rules establish the “general rule” that “[i]n all 
matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the Award is 
enforceable at law.”  
 
2007] DOES INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NEED A MANDATORY RULES METHOD? 113 
  
should also have well founded ethical concerns about deciding the dispute in the 
first instance.   
This last hypothetical presents a more troubling scenario, but for reasons that 
will be clarified below, it properly arises only when the parties explicitly exclude 
arbitral application of one or more mandatory rules.  My sense, however, is that 
this is a rare scenario, and certainly not the case that advocates of the mandatory 
rules method seem to have in mind as their paradigmatic model.  Although parties 
should certainly be allowed to reserve mandatory rules claims for the courts, 
doing so by way of an explicit contractual provision in order to cloak illicit 
activity would only seem to risk calling the courts’ attention to that activity.  It is 
also not the typical case in which privately invocable mandatory rules are likely to 
prove meaningful: generally speaking, private enforcement of mandatory rules 
offers an effective deterrent because one of the parties will have an incentive to 
invoke the rule after a dispute arises.  For obvious reasons, private enforcement 
will provide weaker protections in cases where both parties persist in cloaking 
their mutually illegal activity even after a dispute has arisen.  
In any event, the arbitrator facing such a contract has several options.  One 
possibility is to simply refuse to decide the dispute on ethical grounds.  Another is 
to decide the dispute but expose the potential illegality in a way designed to draw 
the attention of an enforcing court.29  Finally, to the extent that the mandatory rule 
violation is one that draws universal or near universal condemnation from the 
world’s legal systems, the arbitrator might invoke the rule as a matter of so-called 
“truly international public policy.”30  Although this last option resembles the 
mandatory rules method to the extent that it contemplates an arbitrator applying 
law beyond the scope of the contractual mandate, truly international public policy 
(so-named to distinguish it from specialized domestic public policy doctrines that 
are applicable to international disputes) should be less controversial to the extent 
the doctrine focuses on the clearest cases of illicit activity that violates universal 
public policies shared by every or virtually every modern legal system.31  If the 
mandatory rules method were only concerned with this narrow set of cases, then 
surely it would not have occasioned the debate that it has. 
 
B.  Mandatory Rules Within the Contract 
 
If advocates of the mandatory rules method have failed to explain why 
vindication of national public policies requires arbitrators to look beyond the 
                                                                                                                      
29 Of course, the parties might well settle the dispute post-arbitration without ever 
reaching the courts.  
30 See, e.g., Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in 
International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
IN ARBITRATION 227, 251-52 (ICCA Congress Series No. 3, Pieter Sanders ed., 1986). 
31  Note, however, that not all advocates of applying truly international public policy 
have viewed the doctrine in such narrow terms.  See id. (including within the category of 
“truly international public policy” situations in which enforcement of a contract would 
violate the law of the place of performance) 
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litigants’ contract, the irony is that such adventurism may almost never be 
necessary in order to give effect to applicable mandatory rules.  In this respect, the 
perceived necessity of the mandatory rules method on the part of its advocates 
appears to flow from an overly narrow view of the arbitrator’s mandate in the 
standard case.  In particular, much of the literature appears to rest on the mistaken 
assumption that application of any mandatory rule arising under a law other than 
that specified by the parties necessarily creates some tension with arbitration’s 
contractual foundations.32  In fact, the international arbitrator will typically have 
adequate contractual authority to look to additional mandatory laws, and in many 
instances will even be required to do so. 
The clearest example of this phenomenon is where the parties’ choice of law 
itself gives effect to foreign mandatory law, as is the case where the doctrine of 
force majeure excuses a contractual obligation based on an unforeseen illegality in 
the place of performance regardless of whether or not the conduct in question is 
independently proscribed by the law governing the dispute. 33  The parties’ chosen 
law may also prohibit the parties from employing a choice-of-law clause as a 
means of evading an illegality in the place of performance.34  In such cases, 
arbitral reliance on the law of the place of performance can hardly be described as 
a departure from the contract.  Nevertheless, commentators have analyzed the 
arbitral case law in these terms.  The Swiss Hilmarton/OTV case, for example, has 
been described as “clear application of the mandatory rules approach, under which 
the arbitrator felt entitled to give effect to the mandatory rules of a law other than 
that governing the contract.”35  Yet the case report reveals that the arbitrators 
applied an Algerian prohibition on the use of intermediaries to invalidate a 
contract not because they claimed extra-contractual authority, but because they 
believed that the parties’ contractual choice of Swiss law required them to honor 
the public policies of the place of performance.36  Indeed, a previous review that 
                                                                                                                      
32  Surveying the literature, Lazareff concludes, for example, that “[t]here is a growing 
tendency of arbitrators to consider that they are exercising a judicial function that goes 
beyond the will of the parties, thus accepting more and more frequently the need to take 
account of laws other than the lex contractus.”  Lazareff, supra note 2, at 142.   
33  See, e.g., FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 849 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (noting that “a law other than that 
governing the contract which prohibits the export of goods under the conditions set forth 
in the contract could be considered, under the law governing the contract, to be a force 
majeure event”). 
34 For example, courts applying New York law have held that a contract that is 
otherwise unobjectionable under New York law should not be enforced if the contract 
violates the law of its place of performance and the parties entered into the contract with 
the intent to violate that foreign law.  See Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals 
Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp.2d 118, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
35 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 33 at 854; see also JULIAN LEW, 
LOUKAS MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 422 (2003) (same). 
36 Final Award in Case No. 5622 of 1988, XIX Y.B. COM. ARB. 105 (1994).  
Switzerland’s Court of Appeal disagreed and annulled the award on the ground that the 
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Donovan and I conducted of the cases cited in the mandatory rules literature 
confirms Fouchard et al.’s more general observation that there are “virtually no 
cases where the arbitrators have relied on the application of a mandatory rule to 
justify a decision other than that would have resulted from the application of the 
law chosen by the parties.”37 
Even where the parties’ choice-of-law clause does not require application of 
foreign mandatory law, it rarely precludes it.  That is because contractual dispute 
resolution clauses are typically broader than choice-of-law provisions.  Parties 
routinely commit to arbitration not merely breach-of-contract claims, but a 
broader range of actions having some nexus to the contractual relationship.  The 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), for example, urges parties to use a 
model arbitration clause dictating that “[a]ll disputes arising out of or in 
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators 
appointed in accordance with the said Rules.”38  Although the efficiencies of 
broad arbitration clauses are readily apparent—they help parties reduce the risk of 
having their disputes split between multiple fora—, it is also largely on account of 
these provisions that the mandatory rules claims become subject to arbitration.  
Choice-of-law provisions, on the other hand, are typically narrower.  They tend to 
specify the law “governing” the contract itself,39 not the law applicable to all 
disputes “arising out of or in connection” with the contract. 
The critical point is that arbitrators facing this standard pairing of broad 
arbitration provision and narrow choice-of-law clause need not limit their 
consideration of mandatory rules to those arising under the parties’ chosen 
contractual law.  The Mitsubishi case itself is illustrative.  Although the contract 
contained a provision choosing Swiss law, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the 
parties’ submission that the dispute resolution provision encompassed Soler’s 
Sherman Act and RICO claims arising under U.S. law, and it noted that these 
claims were in fact before the arbitrators.40  This logic applies most clearly to non-
contractual claims, but the savvy arbitrator might even extend a similar argument 
to contractual defenses on the ground that, unless the parties have specified 
otherwise, choice-of-law clauses should be read as limited to waivable default 
rules and not extending to any applicable mandatory law whether affirmative or 
                                                                                                                      
arbitrator had misapplied Swiss law and that the result was arbitrary. Tribunal Fédéral 
[Supreme Court], 17 April 1990, XIX Y.B. COM. ARB. 214, 217 (1994).  There was no 
disagreement, however, that the issue was one of correctly applying the parties’ own 
choice of Swiss law.  
37 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 33, at 856-57; Donovan & 
Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 54. 
38 International Chamber of Commerce, “The standard ICC arbitration clause: 
Drafting the arbitration agreement,” available at  http://iccwbo.org/court/english/ 
arbitration/model_clause.asp. 
39 Looking again to the ICC, its rules advise that “it may also be desirable for the 
parties to stipulate in the arbitration clause itself . . . the law governing the contract.”  Id.  
40 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.   
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defensive in nature.  A true conflict between the parties’ agreement and 
consideration of mandatory law may not arise, in other words, unless an arbitrator 
faces a rare instance in which the contract expressly excludes consideration of 
mandatory law.  To the extent arbitrators adopt this approach, conflicts between 
contractual law and mandatory law will largely disappear.  
 
C.  Is There an Alternate Basis for the Mandatory Rules Method? 
 
By now it may seem that there is less than meets the eye to the debate on 
arbitration of mandatory rules.  The standard arguments for ignoring the parties’ 
contractual commitments appear to rest on a mistaken reading of the Mitsubishi 
decision and are not persuasive on their own terms.  And this point itself may 
largely be moot because arbitrators routinely can find authority within the parties’ 
agreement to apply applicable mandatory rules.  Still, this reappraisal of the 
debate does not eliminate the problem of mandatory rules in international 
arbitration.  The fact remains that whether or not there is authority in the contract 
to apply mandatory rules, the arbitrator still faces the question of which, if any, 
mandatory rules to invoke.  The simple answer, of course, is that the arbitrator 
should obey the contract.  But that prescription is of little help when the 
contractual command is far from clear in the face of a broadly phrased dispute 
resolution clause that does not provide clear instructions on the matter.  If 
anything, contractual language of this sort operates as a kind of delegation from 
the parties to the arbitrators to determine which laws to apply.  How should the 
arbitrator go about this task?  Does a distinct mandatory rules method have any 
role to play in this context? 
To unpack this question, it helps to start with the maximal option.  Why 
shouldn’t arbitrators simply apply any applicable mandatory rules that are not 
expressly excluded by the contract?  The Mitsubishi arbitrators, for example, 
would not need to choose between U.S. and Japanese competition laws.  In the 
event that the laws of both states (or a even a third state) extended to the parties’ 
conduct, the arbitrators could simply entertain and decide all applicable claims. 
Mitsubishi’s anti-waiver principle itself supports this approach as a policy matter:  
If parties are not allowed to waive applicable mandatory law, arbitration will 
prove more effective if the arbitrators take cognizance of more rather than fewer 
mandatory claims.  After all, as I have already detailed, a decision to limit or 
exclude consideration of mandatory rules may well preserve those rules for the 
courts, leading to additional, potentially duplicative proceedings that undermine 
the parties’ decision to employ arbitration.   
Seen in this light, the prevalence of dispute resolution clauses reaching more 
broadly than choice-of-law clauses makes sense.  Where waivable default rules 
are at issue, the parties to the contract can make their agreement more concrete 
and predictable by choosing the body of law that will govern contractual 
interpretation.  But unless the parties actually wish to preserve certain mandatory 
claims for the courts, there is no point in limiting arbitrable mandatory rules to 
those arising under only one particular set of national laws.  Thus, the maximal 
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approach provides a plausible reading of the parties’ legitimate expectations in 
cases where the contract does not specify an approach to mandatory rules. 
What then of the balancing approach endorsed by advocates of the mandatory 
rules method?  As should already be apparent, this approach needs to be 
recharacterized.  In the vast majority of cases—and indeed in virtually all of the 
cases cited in the literature41—the balancing approach does not, as frequently 
claimed, involve reaching beyond the parties’ agreement in furtherance of some 
higher duty to protect national public policies.  What the method does instead is 
provide a way of narrowing the range of mandatory rules that might otherwise be 
authorized by the contract. 
Taken at face value, this strategy would appear to be self-defeating given the 
non-waivability of the rules being excluded.  However, the picture becomes more 
complex on account of two inter-related considerations.  The first of these is that 
my argument in favor of the maximal approach rests on the perhaps overly 
simplistic assumption that international arbitrators are able to identify and apply 
all of the substantive mandatory law that would otherwise control the dispute were 
the parties to pursue their remedies in multiple national fora.  But doing so may 
not always be so simple a task.  To truly mirror the likely result in national courts, 
arbitrators would need to consider not only the substantive applicability of those 
rules,42 but also a range of court access issues such as jurisdiction and forum 
convenience.   Would the relevant court system possess personal jurisdiction over 
the suit?  What role would doctrines such as forum non conveniens and 
international comity play in each potential forum?  How would each particular 
court respond to the possibility of parallel proceedings in different countries, and 
what effect would each court (particularly in jurisdictions where assets are 
located) give to foreign judgments concerning the same dispute?  And what effect 
would each jurisdiction give to foreign mandatory rules in resolving the merits of 
the dispute?  In addition, arbitrators might find that different mandatory rules 
conflict with each other, preventing a single resolution to the dispute which gives 
each rule its due. One state’s mandatory rule requiring punitive damages might, 
for example, run up against another state’s prohibition on such damages.43  In 
complex disputes touching upon multiple jurisdictions, it may simply be 
                                                                                                                      
41  Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 54. 
42 In assessing whether to apply statutes outside U.S. territory, for example, courts 
have at times employed a multi-factor comity analysis inspired by the very kind of choice-
of-law balancing that underlies the mandatory rules method.  See Timberlane Lumber Co. 
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  What this means is that an arbitrator following this 
approach would have to undertake substantially the same analysis in applying the Sherman 
Act itself as required by advocates of the mandatory rules method. 
43 Arbitrators might in theory deal with this conflict problem by acknowledging the 
conflict and leaving it to the national courts to decide which parts of the award they wish 
to enforce.  For example, an arbitrator might award punitive damages under one 
mandatory law while noting simultaneously the prohibition of another mandatory law, 
leaving it to the latter jurisdiction to refuse enforcement if it so wishes.  
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impossible—not to speak of costly and time consuming—for an arbitrator to 
confidently determine exactly which mandatory rules would be available to the 
parties absent the arbitration agreement. For the arbitrator wishing to avoid 
wading into these difficulties, some kind of stand-alone mandatory rules method 
might provide a more streamlined and manageable approach that provides a 
decent approximation of the result the parties would otherwise be able to achieve. 
The second, perhaps farther reaching consideration, is that national courts 
may approve of arbitral reliance on some form of mandatory rules method.  As the 
Lloyd’s cases reflect, the non-waivable character of mandatory rules can be 
recharacterized to focus on protecting the core interests behind the mandatory rule 
rather than on honoring every aspect of the rule as codified in a particular national 
law.  One must be careful not to make too much of these precedents, but the 
reasoning exemplified by the Roby decision has potentially far reaching 
consequences for the arbitrator, whose goal need no longer be to apply all 
applicable mandatory laws, but instead to select and apply laws whose protections 
are sufficient to advance the various policies of those states claiming an interest in 
the dispute.  One consequence of this shift may be to mollify, to some degree, the 
concerns of those who fear that, biased or not, international arbitrators lack the 
competence to give national mandatory rules their due.  If, for example, foreign-
trained arbitrators find it difficult to navigate the complexities of U.S. securities 
laws, perhaps the situation is not so dire if those arbitrators are free to select and 
apply the laws of a cognate legal system with which they are more familiar. 
An even farther reaching question is whether there is anything in the Roby 
approach that limits the analysis to national mandatory laws.  Indeed, if the goal is 
simply to apply some law that is adequate to protect the policy interests 
underlying a particular mandatory law, then one might even imagine the 
harmonization of national laws into a common international or transnational 
mandatory law that arbitrators rely upon irrespective of the particulars of any 
given case.  That of course remains a distant goal, and it is one certain to be 
fraught with difficulties. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a comprehensive evaluation of 
these issues.  I will conclude, however, with the more modest proposal that future 
work on the mandatory rules method take more careful account of the context 
within which arbitrators select and apply mandatory rules.  These include not only 
national policies concerning the arbitrability of mandatory rules, but also national 
laws governing the consequences of both arbitral refusal to entertain mandatory 
rules and arbitral overreaching in the form of applying laws not authorized by the 
parties’ agreement.  Perhaps most importantly, as I have already suggested, 
advocates  of  the mandatory rules method should grapple with the fact that, in the  
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vast majority of cases, this method provides a mechanism not to honor public 
policies ignored by the contract, but instead to limit the range of mandatory rules 
which the contract otherwise might make applicable.  Further work on the 
mandatory rules method should proceed from this realization.
